法藏研究

论法藏思想中觉与不觉之相生关系：以《大乘起信论义记》中若干章节为中心

〔美〕詹密罗（Robert M.Gimello）

内容摘要：本文从法藏《大乘起信论义记》中两处彼此独立但又互有关联的文字着手，讨论其思想中关于觉与不觉二者之间互具关系的论述。《大乘起信论义记》悬谈第三之“显教分齐”为法藏针对《大乘起信论》之判教论。文中先分别诸教优劣，再判定《大乘起信论》所特有之教义在佛教思想体系中之地位。法藏确认这一教义为《大乘起信论》关于如来藏与阿梨/赖耶识和合之理论，并依此判《大乘起信论》为“大乘终教”或“熟教”，从而将其纳入华严五教体系，列于五教之第三位上。这一教义之核心，在于指出染污之业心（即所谓“不觉”之心）来自染污掩盖之下不动、清净、光明之心（即所谓“觉”心），并构成此心发生作用时的表现。换言之，这一教义认为心之“染”“净”两种状态，貌似对立之两方，本质上却一体互具，构成所谓“一心”。本文试图说明，法藏将这一教义用来阐释华严之“理事无碍”，并以此为基础，进一步发展华严理论，最终将“理事无碍”置于“事事无碍”之上，定义为华严之终极真理。在《大乘起信论义记》关于心生灭之“不觉”特征的论述中，法藏进一步探讨了如来藏与阿梨/赖耶识的和合。其论点不仅复杂，而且据笔者所知亦相当独特，谓阿梨/赖耶识中之有如来藏、不觉中之有细微之觉，亦可借唯识理论予以论证。唯识谓业相之中不仅有见分与相分之别，而且还有自证分。此自证分通过玄奘与陈那，被法藏命名为“当梨耶自体分”，谓“觉”以性净如来藏的形式存在于“不觉”之阿梨/赖耶识中，即表现为后者业相“极细微”之“自证分”。“自”者，自有也，非外来也，强调“觉”之为“不觉”之本有也。如此，法藏解释“觉”与“不觉”之互具关系，说明二者并非两种不同之心，而是同一之心（所谓“一心”）所具备之两种不同特征。这一关系可模拟“莫比乌斯环”之两面：此环其实只有一个表面，但是在旋转半圈再把两端黏贴上之后，看起来似乎就有两个表面了。如来藏与阿梨/赖耶识，觉与不觉，即同一纸带之两面也！

关键词：觉，《大乘起信论义记》，法藏，不觉

作者简介：詹密罗（Robert M.Gimello），诺特丹大学教授。

One of the Qǐxìn lùn 's several distinctive claims，inspired especially by the Bodhiruci（菩提流支）translation of the Lakāvatāra Sūtra （T 670：《入楞伽经》），is that the ālayavijñāna，the foundational consciousness of the ordinary，unawakened sentient being，consisting in a stream of“arising”（pravtti，生）and“ceasing”（nivtti，灭）of momentary thought-impulses（念），is based upon the tathāgatagarbha，the inherent buddhahood of the sentient being understood as an inviolate，radiant，intrinsic purity of mind.And on the basis of this claim the Qǐxìn lùnadvances the further claim that，precisely because it is based on the tathāgatagarbha，the ālayavijñānamust be understood to be a paradoxical“coincidence of opposites”—specifically，the concurrence or coinherence of awakening and ignorance.As the text says：

As regards the mind's arising and ceasing，1it is on the basis of the tathāgatagarbha that there is an arising and ceasing mind，which is to say that（the mind's）non-arising and non-ceasing is united with its arising and ceasing in such a way that they are neither one and the same nor different.Called the ālayavijñāna，this is consciousness in two senses such as can both encompass and produce all dharmas.What are these two（senses of the ālayavijñāna）？ The first is（the ālayavijñāna）in the sense of（the mind）awake；the second is（the ālayavijñāna）in the sense of（the mind）unawake.

心生灭者。依如来藏故，有生灭心。所谓不生不灭与生灭和合非一非异。名为阿梨耶识，此识有二种义，能摄一切法生一切法。云何为二？一者觉义。二者不觉义。（T 1666：32.576b7-11）

As we shall see，Fǎzàng's interpretation of this claim amounts to what one might call a“dyophysite”view of the“arising and ceasing mind”（生灭心），i.e.，the ālayavijñāna.This foundational mind，he tells us，is actually a single mind but a single mind possessed of two distinct natures，identities，or essential qualities（二相）.These two essential qualities of the ālaya，although functionally distinct，are said to be nevertheless one and the same.Indeed，they are said to be one and the same in a particular and especially strong sense.It is not simply that the mind is a mere mixture or coincidence of“awake”（觉）and“unawake”（不觉）consciousness.The mind awake and the mind unawake are not simply two parts or phases of the mind's operation.Rather，foundational consciousness as the condition of being awake and foundational consciousness as the condition of not being awake are said actually to form，comprise，or constitute each other.They are，Fǎzàng says，“mutually constitutive”（相成）.If one may use a modern metaphor admittedly unknown to the Buddhist tradition one might speak of the arising and ceasing mind as a kind of“Möbius strip（莫比乌斯环）mind”，in which the awake and the unawake natures of the mind constitute each other in much the same way that what might appear to be the two“surfaces”of a Möbius strip are found actually to form a single continuous surface.More will be said about this metaphor below.

Fǎzàng，of course，was quite aware that this teaching of the Qǐxìn lùn （and the Lakāvatāra）was anomalous.In this regard it is like other anomalous teachings of the treatise such as the teaching that suchness（tathatā，真如），which is synonymous with the unconditioned（asaṃskｔａ，无为），is nevertheless subject to permeation（vasanā，熏习）by the thoroughly conditioned（saṃskｔａ，有为）phenomenon of ignorance.The questions such teachings raise are unavoidable.Is not permeation itself a kind of conditioning？ If it is，and if suchness is permeated by ignorance，can it be said to be truly unconditioned？ And if permeation is not a kind of conditioning then what is it？ In particular Fǎzàng was aware that the Qǐxìn lùn 's concept of the ālayavijñānawas variously at odds with the reputedly“orthodox”traditions of Yogācāra in which the category of a foundational consciousness was originally conceived and formulated.We should therefore approach these doctrinal anomalies of the Qǐxìn lùnin the way in which Fǎzàng himself did，i.e.，by dealing explicitly with the question of the relationship of the Qǐxìn lùnto the other doctrines and scriptural authorities of the Mahāyāna tradition.Initial attention will therefore be given in this paper to the doxographical context of Fǎzàng's interpretation，i.e.，his views on the subject of where among the varieties of Mahāyāna scripture and doctrine the Qǐxìn lùn properly belongs.This will lead finally to a consideration of one of Fǎzàng's most surprising interpretative moves，namely，his intriguing but largely overlooked use of the concept of self-awareness（svasaṃvitti/svasaṃvedana）to explain how it is that foundational consciousness，the arising and ceasing mind，can be said to be both awake and not awake.

We begin，then，with an analysis of Fǎzàng's doxographical approach to the text，i.e.，his answer to the question of where，among the varieties of Buddhism，the Qǐxìn lùn properly belongs.We will then proceed to discuss aspects of his reading of the particular section of the Qǐxìn lùn that discusses the theme of the foundational or“arising and ceasing”mind as the coinherence of the mind's awake and not-awake natures.

I.Doxography：Fǎzàng's View of The Place of The Qǐxìn lùn among The Varieties of Buddhist Scripture and Doctrine2

Fǎzàng opens his Exegetical Notes on the Mahāyāna Awakening of Faith （《大乘起信论义记》T 1846），with a short exercise in doxography or doctrinal classification（判教）.3First，he briefly discusses the reasons why the teachings of the Qǐxìn lùn emerged（教起因）.Next，he treats of its place in the architecture of the Buddhist canon（藏摄分齐）—i.e.，why it belongs among scriptures of the abhidharma rather than the sūtra or vinaya type，also why it belongs among works addressed to bodhisattvas rather than to rāvakas.He then proceeds，at greater length，to categorize the Qǐxìn lùn according to its substantive content，its place in the overall system of Buddhist doctrine（教分齐），first by setting forth the narrative and pedagogical order in which Buddhist teachings unfolded（叙诸教）and next by distinguishing，according to their teachings，among Buddhism's principal schools or doctrinal lineages（随教辨宗）.After making passing reference to the schemes of doctrinal classification constructed in China by the“ten experts”（十家）whom he mentions in his own commentary on the Avataṃsakasūtra，4Fǎzàng treats of the classification schemes advanced by two great Indian Buddhist scholars of recent history — īlabhadra（戒贤，529—645）and Jñānaprabha（智光，fl.ca.650）— whose views were explained to him in direct conversations he had in 684 with Divākara（地婆诃罗 /日照，613—688，arrived in China in 678），the Indian Buddhist missionary，also from Nālandā，with whom Fǎzàng collaborated on several translation projects.5

Divākara explained that īlabhadra was a long-serving abbot of Nālandā and heir to the thought of Maitreya，Asaga，Dharmapāla，and Nanda.As such he was said to hold to the theory of“three turnings of the wheel of the dharma”（三转法轮）classically set forth in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra （《解深密经》）.According to this theory the Buddha's teaching unfolded in three phases.First there was a hīnayāna phase in which the doctrines of karma，dependent origination，and no-self were taught in such a way as to support the view that，although there are no personal selves，nevertheless dharmas，sub-personal constituents of the real，do exist（有）.This was followed by a second stage in which the doctrines of the emptiness and the imagined（parikalpita，遍计所执）nature of all dharmas were taught but not yet the doctrines of their other-dependent（paratantra，依他）and perfect（parinpanna，圆成）natures.The culmination was a final phase in which all three natures（三性），and all three absences of nature（三无性），were taught so as to avoid both the extreme view of substantive existence（有边）and the extreme view of nihilistic emptiness（空边）.Rather，the ultimate truth or constitution of reality（尽理），6the true middle path revealed in the third phase，was said to consist in simultaneous recognition of both the emptiness of the imagined nature（所执性空）of all things and the existence of their other two natures（余二为有），namely，their other-dependent and perfect natures.

Jñānaprabha，on the other hand，was said to be heir to Mañjurī，Nāgārjuna，and Āryadeva.He too held to a“three phases”theory of the evolution of the Buddha's teaching.However，for him the first phase，tailored to the needs of beings of inferior faculties，taught that both the mind and the objects of mind exist（心境俱有），whereas in the second phase，suited to those of mediocre faculties，the Buddha taught a“Mahāyāna of the marks of dharmas”（法相大乘）which held to the principle of representation-only whereby objects are empty and mind alone exists（境空心有唯识道理）.This phase is said also to have introduced，for the sake of those who fear true emptiness（怖畏此真空），the notion of the provisional existence of other-dependent causes and conditions（依他因缘假有）.In the third and final phase what the Buddha taught was the“ultimate Mahāyāna”（究竟大乘），the“markless Mahāyāna”（无相大乘）in which the true final meaning（真了义）of the Buddha's teaching is said to be the“one flavor that all things share equally”（平等一味），namely the truth that the conditioned arising of things is just their emptiness of self-nature（缘生即是性空）.

It is clear that Fǎzàng understood īlabhadra to be an adherent of what we now call Yogācāra but which Fǎzàng himself called“Fǎxiāng”（法相），the tradition of the“marks”or characteristics of dharmas.As such，he regarded Madhyamaka as a merely preliminary teaching.Jñānaprabha Fǎzàng knew to be a follower of the Madhyamaka and a critic īlabhadra's Yogācāra，which he saw as only a preliminary to Madhyamaka.However，Fǎzàng was troubled by the contradictions（矛盾）between the doctrinal systems（教分齐）of these two eminent masters，both of whom were leaders of the intellectual community at Nālandā，the one quite senior，the other younger but still highly respected.He therefore asked himself if their schemes of doctrinal classification could possibly be reconciled（可和会以不）.In answer he says that they are in one way incompatible but in another way not incompatible.They are incompatible insofar as they are designed to serve different kinds of beings whose needs vary with circumstances（随缘益物）and whose delights，desires，and inclinations（乐欲趣）also vary in such a way that some particular teachings are praised while others are condemned（于一法中或赞或毁）.As for their compatibility（their being“not incompatible”），Fǎzàng says that，generally speaking，the question of how definitive or non-definitive are the teachings expounded by īlabhadra and Jñānaprabha can be approached in two ways（通论此二所设教门，了与不了有其二门）.One can ascertain the definitiveness or non-definitiveness of classified teachings on the basis of how broadly or narrowly they accommodate beings and how complete or lacking their teachings are（约摄生宽狭，言教具阙，以明了不了）.Alternatively，one can determine this on the basis of two criteria，the criterion of graduated increase of benefits to beings and the criterion of the degree to which they advance or retard the manifestation of the constitutive truth of all things（二约益物渐次，显理增微）.

In īlabhadra's Yogācāra approach based on the Saṃdhinirmocana，the teachings of both the initial and the second phases are judged to be not definitive for they are limited in their accommodation of beings，the first being addressed only to Hīnayānists，the second addressed only to Mahāyānists.But，as the teachings of the third phase were addressed to adherents of all three vehicles，those teaching are judged to be completely definitive and all accommodating.Likewise，in īlabhadra's scheme teachings are said to be propounded according to the capacities of beings（约机出教）.Accordingly，Fǎzàng finds īlabhadra's system to be not definitive insofar as it assigns to the first phase only the exposition of the Hīnayāna and to the second phase only the enunciation of the Mahāyāna，but he finds it to be definitive insofar as it assigns to the third period the enunciation of all three vehicles.

Fǎzàng then applies these same criteria to Jñānaprabha's classification scheme.By the criterion of graduated benefit to beings（约益物渐次）it is incomplete and thus not definitive（益未究竟）because it describes the benefit of the Buddha's teaching in the first period as leading only to the attainment of the Hīnayāna and because it describes the benefit of the teachings of the second phase as extending to the Mahāyāna as well as the Hīnayāna but as insufficient to lead those in the quiescence-oriented two vehicles to attain also to the Mahāyāna（第二时中虽益通大小，然不能令趣寂二乘亦得大乘）.However，because the teachings of the third phase lead all to attain the Mahāyāna and cause even those who have entered quiescence to turn toward the great awakening（普皆令得大乘之益。纵入寂者亦令回向大菩提故），we may say that Jñānaprabha's theory is definitively true.By the alternative criterion of whether it advances or retards manifestation of the constitutive truth of things（显理增微）Fǎzàng finds Jñānaprabha's system of classification again to be not definitive because it holds first that what is conditionally arisen is actually existent，then that it is only provisionally existent，and finally that it is empty of self-nature.Its manifestation of truth，therefore，is not comprehensive and its understanding of conditions is not thorough.But he also finds Jñānaprabha's system to be definitive in the sense that it holds the teachings of the third phase to reveal the constitutive truth of things in its ultimacy and to thoroughly understand conditionality（后一显理至究，会缘相尽）.

Because their systems can be approached in these two ways（i.e.from the perspective of their graduated increase of benefits to beings and from the perspective of the degree to which they advance or retard the manifestation of truth）Fǎzàng says that each sacred teaching（i.e.，both īlabhadra's and Jñānaprabha's system of doctrinal classification），succeeds in clarifying the relation between the provisional and the actual by relying on one and the same compelling argument.He concludes，therefore，that finally they do not contradict one another（由有如此二种门故。是故圣教各依一势以明权实，互不相违）.

Fǎzàng next notes that the Avataṃsaka Sūtra was enunciated in the immediate aftermath of the Buddha's awakening and thus should be assigned chronologically，as are the Hīnayāna scriptures，to the first period in the Buddha's teaching career.How is it then，he asks，that the Avataṃsaka is not also properly classified as a Hīnayāna scripture and is not to be understood as addressed only to rāvakas.This question，though technical，is of importance to Fǎzàng because it allows him to argue，in an intricate way，that the scripture on which his Huáyán tradition is based and which he regards as the most profound of all scriptures，cannot be confined within the three phases scheme.The Avataṃsaka，he insists in so many words，is in a class by itself because，paradoxically，the silent Buddha of that scripture spoke in a“perfect voice”（圆音）that transcends time and that“speaks”，all at once，to all beings，each being hearing whatever his capacities to understand allow.Finally，Fǎzàng addresses the second of his two general approaches to the task of properly situating the teachings of the Qǐxìn lùn among varieties of Buddhist doctrine.Having concluded the approach of setting forth the temporal and pedagogical unfolding of the Buddha's teaching（叙诸教），he proceeds to distinguish the various fundamental principles or doctrinal lineages of Buddhism according to their teachings（随教辨宗）.7Taking Buddhism as a whole，including both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna，Fǎzàng says，there are just four basic doctrinal positions，i.e.，four fundamental tenets or four traditions each one of which holds to one of those four fundamental tenets：

·The first is the basic tenet，or the lineage holding the basic tenet，of the grasping of dharmas according to their marks or characteristics（随相法执）.This is the basic tenet of the collection of schools（nikāya，部）that comprise the Hīnayāna，and it is the core of all the doctrines that they share.It consists essentially in the teaching，by the various Hīnayāna masters，that dharmas are grasped according to their phenomenal or empirical features（随事执相）.

·The second is the tenet，or the tradition based on the tenet，of the true emptiness and marklessness of all things（真空无相），which holds that the constitutive truth of all phenomena is revealed in the coalescence of phenomena（会事显理）.This is taught in the Prajñāpāramitā and other such sūtras and in the Mādhyamikakārikā and other such treatises by Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva.

·The third is the basic tenet，or the tradition based on the tenet，that the phenomenal characteristics of dharmas are representations-only（唯识/法相）and that phenomena in their diversity arise out of，or are a function of，the basic constitution of all phenomena（依理起事差别）.This tenet is taught in the Saṃdhinirmocana and others such sūtras and in the Yogācārabhūmi and other such treatises by Asaga and Vasubandhu.

·The fourth basic tenet，and the tradition that accepts it as basic，holds the conception of dependent origination as a function of the tathāgatagarbha （如来藏缘起）.This is taught in the Lakāvatāra，Ghanavyūha，and others such sūtras and in such treatises as Avaghoa's Awakening of Faith and Saramati's Ratnagotravibhāga.This tenet holds that lǐ （理） and shì（事），i.e.，the constitutive truth of all phenomena and all phenomena themselves，are interfused and coinherent（理事圆融无碍）.It allows that the tathāgatagarbha，in according with conditions，becomes the ālayavijñāna，from which it follows that the fundamental constitution of all phenomena pervades all phenomena themselves（以此宗中许如来藏随缘成阿赖耶识，此则理彻于事也）.It also allows that all things，in their other-dependent arising and insubstantiality，are one with suchness，from which it follows that every phenomenon pervades the fundamental constitution of all phenomena（亦许依他缘起无性同如。此则事彻于理也）.

Of special interest here is a particular claim made about the fourth tenet，which is said to be the basic purport of the Qǐxìn lùn.Clearly Fǎzàng is assigning the basic teaching of Qǐxìn lùn to what is called，elsewhere in the Huáyán tradition，the category of teachings that propound the doctrine of 理事无碍，i.e.，the interfusion of each particular phenomenon with the general truth that governs or most basically constitutes all phenomena.This is also the category that is described as“Final”or“Mature”Mahāyāna（大乘终/熟教）and which is said to be superior to the“initial”or“elementary”Mahāyāna（大乘始教）of both the Prajñāpāramitā/Madhyamaka tradition and the Yogācāra or“Dharma Charateristics”（法相）tradition.In the terminology of contemporary Buddhist studies we may describe this fourth category as that of the Tathāgatagarbha or Buddha-nature tradition，the tradition which focuses on the essential（Buddha-）nature［（佛）性］of things rather than on their perceived，phenomenally defining characteristics（相）.

What is particularly noteworthy here is the way in which Fǎzàng applies the theme of interfusion of the principle or constitution of all phenomena with the particularity of each phenomenon（理事无碍）to the central focus of the Qǐxìn lùn，namely，the analysis of mind（xīn，心）.In the traditions out of which the Qǐxìn lùn arose8 there were two conflicting conceptions of mind.In one conception，the mind at its deepest level was seen to be the store or repository consciousness（ālayavijñāna，藏识/阿赖耶识/阿梨耶识）.The nature of the ālayavijñāna was a subject of complex dispute，but generally speaking one may say that it was seen to be a repository chiefly of defilements，spoken of metaphorically as“seeds”or latent potentialities（bīja，种子），that are susceptible to purification only by the infusion or impregnation（vāsanā，熏）of extrinsic pure seeds，as when one hears the words of a Buddha（rutavāsanā，正闻熏习）that，in turn，issue from the entirely pure realm of truth（suviuddhadharmadhātuniyanda，最清净法界等流）.The ultimate goal of such infusion of beneficent influences is a radical transformation of the ālayavijñāna —— a“revolution of the base”（ārayaparāvtti，转依）—by which it becomes a mind of an entirely different character.The chief alternative to this theory of mind was the tradition focused on the theme of tathāgatagarbha （如来藏）or buddha-nature（佛性）.In this tradition the underlying nature（prakｔｉ，性）of the mind，its essential character，is understood to be utterly radiant（prabhāsvara，极光）and pure（viuddhi，清净）.It is held to be a mind that is transcendent insofar as it is“disentangled”（出缠）from the corruptions of the world，yet it is also immanent in its presence amidst，or its“entanglement”（在缠）with，those corruptions.Defilements（klea，烦恼），in this view，are merely adventitious（āgantuka，客）and superficial and may be simply wiped away by moral and contemplative effort without any change in the essential nature of the mind.

The question that troubled many medieval Chinese Buddhists was how to reconcile these two diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of the mind and how also to bring them into concordance with the conception of emptiness that is said to apply to both.Fǎzàng's specific contribution to this issue，at this point in the doxographical section of his Commentary on the Qǐxìn lùn，was to bring to bear on the question of the relationship between the ālayavijñāna and the tathāgatagarbha the Huáyán categories of lǐ （理）and shì （事）.He says that the relationship of the tathāgatagarbha to the ālayavijñāna is like，is indeed an instance of，the relationship of lǐ to shì.It is a relationship of pervasion or penetration（彻），and as such it allows for fusion of the two ideas of mind without either one cancelling out the other.This insight，I would suggest，may lie at the heart of the attraction that the Qǐxìn lùn had for Huáyán thinkers like Fǎzàng，his teacher Zhìyǎn（智俨），9and others.

So，while it is clear that Fǎzàng does not place the Qǐxìn lùn in the highest of Huáyán doxographical categories—that is to say，he does not judge it to be an expression of the perfect or consummate teaching（圆教）— nevertheless，by placing it in the category of“mature Mahāyāna”（熟大乘）and by employing the Huáyán theme of“the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena”（理事无碍）to characterize it，he does establish a close connection between the Qǐxìn lùn and the Avataṃsaka tradition.Moreover，as this connection is pondered over time the Huáyán tradition（in Fǎzàng's later writings and，more clearly，in the writings of Chéngguān（澄观）and Zōngmì（宗密）moves toward an advocacy of“the non-obstruction of principle and phenomena”（理事无碍）as the highest of insights.10

II.Fǎzàng on the Qǐxìn lùn's View of the Nature of the Arising and Ceasing Mind（心生灭）as Not-awake（不觉）11

Being a treatise that lies，as Fǎzàng has shown，at the confluence of three great traditions of Mahāyāna Buddhist thought —ūnyavāda，Yogācāra，and Tathāgatagarbha—the Qǐxìn lùn is an inherently unstable or wavering text that often seems to contradict itself or to revel in paradox.It is also an inherently anomalous text insofar as it does not fit neatly into any of Mahāyāna Buddhism's standard doctrinal systems or categories.In many of its sections，in fact，the Qǐxìn lùn reads like an exercise in doctrinal double-talk or deliberate equivocacy，continuously vacillating back and forth among the cardinal insights of all three of the great Mahāyāna traditions，despite the seeming contradictions among them，all the while trying to avoid settling finally in any one of them.Its overriding pattern of argument，then，is such that whenever it asserts something it soon also asserts the seeming contrary or opposite.

Consider what the text itself declares to be its principal theme，“the mind of sentient beings”（众生心），defined as the dharma （法），i.e.，the referent as distinct from the significance（义），12of the term “mahāyāna”（摩诃衍）.13After telling us that the mind is“one”，a single reality（一心法），the text immediately commits its first reversal by telling us that this one thing is two-fold，or that there are two approaches to it or two presentations of it.First there is the mind as suchness（tathatā，真如），which the text defines as the one dharmadhātu or“realm of truth”（一法界），the great all-encompassing character of all things（大总相），the very substance of all the teachings（法门体）.Now，a cardinal claim of one of the sources of Qǐxìn lùn doctrine，namely，the emptiness tradition，is that suchness（the equivalent，in positive language，of emptiness）does not admit of either production or cessation.Things that are“such-like”and empty cannot be said either to have been produced or to ever cease.For this reason，suchness is ultimately ineffable（离名字相），separate from any mental object（离心缘相，i.e.incapable of being an object or ordinary cognition），ultimately free of differentiation（究竟平等），and unchanging（无有变异）.Nevertheless，the text goes on to say，risking apparent self-contradiction，that the mind of a sentient being is not only the mind-as-suchness but also a mind-that-arises-and-ceases（心生灭）.

This rhetorical pattern，which Fǎzàng dubs“contraposing”（反举），is a sequence of statements followed by counter-statements，negations followed by affirmations（or vice-versa），and it continues，marking the whole tenor of the Qǐxìn lùn 's argument.When the text resumes its discussion of the mind-as-suchness it immediately says that that mind is both empty（空）and yet not empty（不空）.And when it takes up again the topic of the mind as arising and ceasing，which it identifies with both the ālayavijñāna and tathāgatagarbha，it says that it is both awake（觉）and yet not awake（不觉）.14Because the“awake-and-yet-not-awake”claim about the minds of sentient beings seems to be a kind of terminus of the Qǐxìn lùn 's string of statements-followed-by-counter-statements，we will take this as our principal topic.The text's view of the phenomenal mind as awake，which it defines most generally as the substance of the mind divorced from thinking or momentary conceptualization（心体离念），is well known to be also dual in nature.15It is both incipiently awake or in the process of waking up（始觉），on the one hand，and，on the other hand，originally or fundamentally awake（本觉）.I would suggest that for a Mahāyāna Buddhist who believes in the prospect of universal bodhi，the ultimate awakening of all beings，it is relatively easy to hold the view that the minds of sentient beings are in some sense already possessed of，or at least inherently oriented toward，awakening.However，it seems rather more difficult for such a believer in universal awakening to understand how it is that，despite their inherent proclivity toward awakening，all beings are in some real and fundamental sense—not in a merely apparent or superficial sense—not awake.We will therefore focus on the especially challenging theme of the not-awake nature of the arising and ceasing mind so as to see what Fǎzàng makes of it.

Consider，then，the section of the Qǐxìn lùn that treats of the mind as not awake.It begins its discussion by saying，

As for what is called（mind in）the unawake sense，this refers to the fact that a mind unawake arises，and its momentary conceptualizations16 occur，because one does not know，as it truly is，the oneness of the dharma of suchness.And as momentary conceptualizations have no own marks（no substantive identities of their own），17they are not separate from the originally awake（mind）.

所言不觉义者，谓不如实知真如法一故。不觉心起而有其念。念无自相，不离本觉。（T 1666：32.576c29-577a2）

The discussion ends with the line，

That one speaks of a mark of difference（between the mind awake and the mind unawake），is because，just as various earthenware containers are unlike one another（although they are all have the same nature of clay），so do the purity（of the mind awake）and the ignorance（of the mind unawake）differ apparitionally，the former by its involvement in pollution，the latter by its nature as pollution.

言异相者，如种种瓦器各各不同，如是无漏无明，随染幻差别，性染幻差别故。（T 1666：32.577b1-2）18

The section of the Qǐxìn lùn bracketed by these two lines Fǎzàng treats at some length（T 1846：44.262a9-264b1），dividing it and his commentary thereon into three parts.The first part treats of the arising and ceasing mind as fundamentally unawake（根本不觉），illuminating its substance（明不觉体）.The second deals with the implications or ramifications（枝末）of the mind unawake，illuminating its characteristics or attributes（明不觉相）.The third ties its ramifications back together with its fundamental character（结末归本），joining those attributes together as one with its substance（结相同体）.We will treat here of the first of these three，examining what Fǎzàng has to say about the arising and ceasing mind in and of itself，apart from its ramifications.

As regards the substance of the mind unawake，Fǎzàng notes that the text first speaks，in its typically paradoxical way，of delusion as constituted by the mind awake and then of delusion as manifesting the mind awake（初依觉成迷，后依迷显觉）.The essential point made here is that the mind unawake has the character of error.It is nothing more than the failure to understand correctly the oneness of suchness（不如实知真如法一）.The fleeting thoughts that arise from this error，insofar as they are possessed of no substantial identity of their own，are also apparitional.They are just phantasms，particular iterations of error.In substance，then，the mind unawake is likened to the condition of a lost man.That the man can be said to be lost depends on his having had a destination to which he intended to travel（which would entail a distinction of one direction from others）.If he were detached from the notion of destination，if he had no destination，then there would be no getting lost.Such is the case too with sentient beings.Their being“lost”or“deluded”follows from their reliance on a mere construct like the construct of“direction”.The distinction between“awake”and“unawake”is such a construct.In the context of this construct it makes no sense to assume that the mind awake and the mind unawake are different in anything other than an apparitional sense，for divorced from the nature of wakefulness there is no condition of not being awake（犹如迷人，依方故迷。若离于方，则无有迷。众生亦尔。依觉故迷，若离觉性，则无不觉。）.

In sum，Fǎzàng is saying that when we look to the mind in its unawake nature we are not looking at an alternative and inferior mind distinct from but connected to a higher awake mind.Sentient beings are not possessed of two linked minds，one clear，the other obscured.Rather they are possessed of a single mind the nature or substance of which is twofold，but only in a paradoxical sense.A metaphor for this paradox（quite unknown，of course，to the Huáyán tradition but useful perhaps for its modern interpreters）may be the Möbius strip（莫比乌斯环）.The two“sides”or“surfaces”of a Möbius strip comprise a single continuous surface.In this visual metaphor it is not simply that the recto surface of the strip is，as it were，also its verso surface.More than that，the uncanny nature of the Möbius strip metaphor requires that one rethink，reimagine，or redefine the very idea of side or surface，perhaps even that one discard such a notion（just as the man who wishes not to be“lost”can achieve that end by discarding the notion of“direction”）.It is only before the Möbius strip is formed，when the flat band has not yet been twisted 180 degrees and its ends not yet joined，that we can speak of different“sides”and “surfaces”.Once the twisting has occurred and the ends have been seamlessly joined（recall Fǎzàngs's use of the word 结），the notion of two sides or two surfaces simply vanishes.So too with the mind as“awake”and as“not awake”.The conventional view is that the Buddhist path is a linear movement from the condition of being not awake to the goal of being awake.But，once the very notion of goal or end or destination is discarded，the words“awake”and“not awake”collapse into one another，cancel each other out，and no longer ultimately apply.To a Huáyán thinker like Fǎzàng，accustomed to notions of interfusion（相融），non-obstruction（无碍），and mutual entailment or inter-identity（相即），this claim of the Qǐxìn lùn about the relation between the awake mind and the unawake mind must have seemed very familiar and gratifying.It must also have confirmed him in his view that the Qǐxìn lùn and Huáyán are not merely compatible but are actually mutually corroborating.It may also have raised questions about where，exactly，the Qǐxìn lùn belonged in the doxography（判教制度）of Huáyán.In the introductory section of his Commentary，as we saw，Fǎzàng located the treatise in the rank of the“mature”（熟）or“final”（终）Mahāyāna，i.e.，as belonging to the category of what we now call Tathāgatagarbha Buddhism.But is it not the case that his analysis of the argument of the treatise suggests that he actually saw it also as approaching in its profundity the consummate teaching（圆教）？ Could it not even be that Fǎzàng's reading of the“substance of the unawake mind”（不觉体）section of Qǐxìn lùn，along with his readings of other parts of the treatise，helped gradually to alter the definition of the consummate teaching？

Möbius strip（莫比乌斯环）

Fǎzàng's analysis of the next of the three stages into which he divided the Qǐxìn lùn 's exposition of the unawake nature of the mind is too complex and lengthy to be treated here in full.That exposition begins with the Qǐxìn lùn's claim that“on the basis of the unawake（mind）there arise three kinds of mental attributes that are associated with the unawake（mind）rather than separate from it”（依不觉故，生三种相，与彼不觉相应不相离）.They are，

1.The activity（karma）19or active character of ignorance（无明业相）.This is the movement or motility of the unawake mind，which stands in contrast to the stasis or immotility of the awake mind.And from the motility of the unawake mind comes suffering，for an effect is not separate from its cause.（以依不觉故心动说名为业。觉则不动，动则有苦，果不离因故。）

2.The subjective or perceiving nature of the ignorant unawake mind（能见相 = darana bhaga，pramāṇa，grahākāra，etc.）.This too is a function of the fact that the unawake mind，having the character of transformation or change（pravtti-lakana，转相），is always in motion，whereas the awake mind，being inherently pure，does not move，and so does not have the character of a perceiving subject.（第二能见相。即是转相。依前业相转成能见。故言以依动故能见。若依性净门。则无能见。）

3.The objective nature of the ignorant，unawake mind，i.e.，its nature as in the realm of objects of consciousness（境界相 = nimitta/viaya bhaga，prameya，or grāhyākāra，viayābhāsa，etc.）.This consists in delusions that appear as objects because they are dependent on the subjectivity of ignorance（以依能见故，境界妄现）.

Fǎzàng then comments that this aspect of the unawake mind，its active character，has itself two senses，its sense as function or movement（动作义）and its sense as cause（为因义）.20This distinction，in turn，allows Fǎzàng to draw into his reading of the Qǐxìn lùn certain of the basic concepts of Yogācāra thought and to use those concepts both to address some of the basic epistemological and ontological implications of the Qǐxìn lùn 's philosophy of mind and to clarify their implications for the text's view of the practice of contemplation or meditation.

Apropos of its sense as function or movement（动作义），and focusing first on the lines，“it is because of its being not-awake that the mind moves”（以依不觉故心动）and“when awake it does not move”（觉则不动），he says that，

The time of the incipience of awakening is when there are no active（moving）momentary conceptualizations，and from this we know that，in the present，21the movement of the mind is just the result of its not being awake.

既得始觉时即无动念。是知今动只由不觉也。

Then，apropos of its sense as cause（为因义），and focusing on the clause“when the mind moves there is suffering”（心……动则有苦），he says，

When the mind attains the condition of quiescence free of momentary conceptualizations，just then is there the marvelous joy of nirvāṇa.Therefore we know that as soon as the mind moves there is the painful turbulence of saṃsāra.

如得寂静无念之时。即是涅槃妙乐。故知今动则有生死苦患。

Finally—and most significantly for our purposes—he focuses on the clause，“the effect is not separate from the cause”（果不离因）and says，

When the mind does not move there is joy and so we know that movement of the mind necessarily brings suffering.Movement as the cause and suffering as the effect occur simultaneously，and this is why we say that cause and effect are not separate.Although this（the causing of suffering by the movement of the mind）is a movement of momentary conceptualization，it is extremely subtle and its dependent origination is a unity without distinction of subject and object.Just this corresponds to the proper substance22 of the ālayavijñāna.As the Treatiseon Marklessness 23 says，“Question：what is the distinctive mark of this consciousness（the ālayavijñāna），and what is its object？ Answer：its distinctive mark and its object cannot be distinguished from one another.They are in essence one and the same.”One should understand this as pertaining to the sense of the ālayavijñāna in its active character.

不动既乐。即知动必有苦。动因苦果既无别时。故云不相离也。此虽动念而极微细。缘起一相，能所不分。即当梨耶自体分也。如《无相论》云：“问，此识何相何境界？答，相及境界不可分别，一体无异。”当知此约赖耶业相义说也。

In brief outline，the passage in the Qǐxìn lùnthat Fǎzàng is here interpreting is an abbreviated and somewhat idiosyncratic statement of the Yogācāra analysis of the foundational consciousness as tripartite.In Yogācāra as codified in Xuánzàng's（玄奘）*Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi （《成唯识论》），the ālaya，which encompasses the mind（citta，心）and all mental factors（caitas， 心所法），is conventionally analyzed as comprising two，three，or four“parts”（bhāga， 分）or“aspects”（lakana，相）— the subjective or“seeing part”（the darana-bhāga，见分；a.k.a.grāhaka，pramāṇa）；the objective or“image part”（nimitta-bhāga， 相分；a.k.a.，grāhya，prameya）；the apperceptive or“self-awareness part”（svaṃvitti-bhāga， 自证分）；and the hyper-apperceptive or“awareness of self-awareness part”（svasaṃvitti-saṃvitti-bhāga， 证自证分）.The Qǐxìn lùndiffers from this standard Yogācāra model in speaking only of the first three parts and in substituting the term“activity”（karma，业）for the term svasaṃvitti.However，in commenting on this passage，Fǎzàng，who was certainly familiar with Xuánzàng's compendium and the school of thought based thereon，does invoke the notion of self-awareness.First he explains the activity or active character of the ālayaas being both a function（动作）and a cause（因）.As a function it is simply the inherent instability or motility of the ignorant，unawake mind.As a cause，it is the ignorant mind's capacity to effect suffering.He then says that the instability or motility of the ignorant，unawake mind，which is the cause（因）of suffering，is not separate from（不相离）the suffering which is its effect（果）.Rather the two are necessarily coincident（动必有苦）and simultaneous（无别时）.Although this process，i.e.，the unstable mind's causing suffering，is a kind of dependent origination（缘起），it is of an extremely subtle（极微细）kind insofar as it is an instance of the oneness or unity（一相）of cause and effect.Suffering，in other words，is not subsequent to mental instability；rather it is simultaneous with it.It is at this point in his argument Fǎzàng makes an explicit reference to self-awareness saying that the active character of the ignorant，unawake mind is“precisely the proper substance of ālaya ”（即当梨耶自体分也）.And，as the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiexplicitly says，“The proper substance on which both the objective and the subjective parts（of foundational consciousness）are based，and by virtue of which it is called a real entity（事，*dravya），is precisely its self-awareness part”（相见所以自体名事即自证分，T 1585：31.10b7）.We see，therefore，that Fǎzàng and Xuánzàng agree that self-awareness is of the essence foundational consciousness and that it is on the basis of self-conciousness that the ālayamay be said to be“real”or“actual”（dravya-sat）rather than merely“notional”or“provisional”（prajñapti-sat）.Self-awareness，then，is assigned an especially important role in the functioning of the foundational consciousness，and that importance consist in the fact that it is “self-constituted”（自体）.

Although this reference to the self-awareness of the foundational consciousness may seem to be a topic of only technical and limited significance，and although it is mentioned more or less only in passing，it is actually a kind of key to Fǎzàng's understanding of a whole series of important issues.It helps explain why Fǎzàng was convinced that there is a close relationship between Huáyán and the Qǐxìn lùn ；it clarifies his understanding of the Qǐxìn lùn 's distinctive view of the relationship between the ālayavijñāna and tathāgatgarbha；and it makes unexpected sense of his approach to the treatise's paradoxical claim that the fundamental mind of a sentient being is both awake and not awake.Drawing on his familiarity with the Yogaācāra tradition，Fǎzàng here makes an intriguing connection between the notion of self-awareness or reflexive consciousness and the idea that activity of an especially subtle kind is an essential attribute of the foundational mind in its unawake mode or dimension.In what does its subtlety consist？ Recall that the ālayavijñānais distinguished from the other seven kinds of consciousness it supports［kliamanas （染末那识），manovijñāna （意识），and the five corporeal sense consciousnesses］insofar as it is not assigned a cognitive function，if by cognition one means the two-part（二分）function in which a subjective ingredient in cognition（darana-bhāga，见分/grāhya，能取）apprehends an objective ingredient（nimitta-bhāga，相分 / grāhaka，所取）.But what then could consciousness free of the subject-object dichotomy be except self-consciousness？ Recall also that simultaneity，of the kind Fǎzàng here attributes to the relation between the movement of the mind and suffering，also marks self-awareness which in Yogācāra is not subsequent to a subject's cognition of an object but is simultaneous with it.This makes of self-awareness a kind of exception to the law of conditionality（pratītyasamutpāda，缘起）.Likened famously to a lamp's illuminating itself in the very moment in which it illuminates its surroundings，self-awareness is said，as it were，to be an instance self-causation.It is a capacity at the heart of the mind that is born only of，is dependent only upon，itself.Can we not say then that it is an instance of the unconditioned operative within the order of conditionality？ And is not the same thing said about the tathāgatagarbha，that it too is something unconditioned mysteriously present in the order of conditionality？

How surprising is this？ What Fǎzàng is claiming is that the movement of the ignorant，unawake mind——its active character（业相）——is not only a domain of mental agitation that separates subject from object and so begets attachment and suffering.Insofar as it is always，in the each moment of its operation，simultaneously self-aware，the arising and ceasing mind or ālayavijñānais identified as the locus of the sort of self-sprung，inviolate purity and clarity that is in other contexts is called citta prakti viuddhi （the naturally pure mind），prabhāsvara citta （the radiant mind），tathāgatagarbha，or buddha-nature（buddhagotra，佛性/佛姓）！ That the ālayavijñānais said to be in some subtle sense self-aware，or to be the essential and self-aware component of very act of consciousness，and that it is therefore held to be a kind of subliminal consciousness free of the dichotomy of subject and object — all this suggests that，despite its role as a repository of defilements，it is itself，as distinct from the seeds it carries，intrinsically pure.This，I would suggest，is the warrant for the Qǐxìn lùn 's distinctive and often disputed claim that the tathāgatgarbha is the foundation of the ālayavijñāna.The tathāgatagarbha，after all，is said to be the underlying purity of the otherwise polluted minds of sentient beings.If we were to search for evidence of the deep presence of the tathāgatagarbha amidst our faulty，agitated，defiled minds，Fǎzàng is implying，then the noetic location where we may find it is deep within the core of the unawake mind's“most subtle”（极微细）activity，i.e.，in its very“self-essence part”（自体分），which“corresponds precisely to the svasaṃvitti of the ālayavijñāna”（即当梨耶自体分也）.The asserted capacity of the unawake mind，in its ordinary“arising and ceasing”functioning，to be subliminally self-aware is therefore justification for belief in the existence of some unmoving，undefiled，transcendent dimension of mind lying beneath the apparitional defiled and defiling movements of the ordinary mind.It is on this basis，I would suggest，that the Qǐxìn lùn can make its claim that ālayavijñāna and tathāgatgarbha，usually regarded as opposites，are ultimately one.This is also a link，one of several that Fǎzàng discerned in the treatise，between the epistemology of Yogācāra and the ontology of Huáyán，ontology being the direction in which Huáyán thinkers often took their studies of Yogācāra.It is the epistemological counterpart to Huáyán's ontological claim that individual phenomena and the constitutive truth of all phenomena are coinherent（理事无碍）.It also goes far toward explaining why Fǎzàng，and all other Huáyán thinkers，were so enamored of the Qǐxìn lùn even though they could not place it in the highest Huáyán doctrinal category as a document of the“perfect or consummate teaching”（圆教）.

Appendix I

Chinese Text（《大乘起信论义记》，卷一，T 1846：44.242a25-244c8）：Fǎzàng on the Doxography of the Qǐxìn lùn ：Finding the Proper Place of the Awakening among Buddhist Teachings and Traditions.

Note：In the following transcription progressive indentation is used to reveal the structure of Fǎzàng's commentary.

第三显教分齐者。于中有二。

先叙诸教。

后随教辨宗。

　　前中此方诸德立教开宗纷扰多端。难可具陈。略述十家。如《华严疏》中。

又古代译经。西来三藏。所立教相。亦有多门。略举五家。亦如彼说。

今中天竺国三藏法师（242b1）地婆诃罗。唐言日照。在寺翻译。余亲问。说云。近代天竺那烂陀寺。同时有二大德论师。一曰戒贤。一曰智光。并神解超伦。声高五印。六师稽颡。异部归诚。大乘学人仰之如日月。独步天竺。各一人而已。遂所承宗异。立教互违。

　　　　谓戒贤则远承弥勒、无着。近踵护法、难陀。依《深密》等经《瑜伽》等论。立三种教。以法相大乘为真了义。谓佛初鹿园转于四谛小乘法轮。说诸有为法从缘生。以破外道自性因等。又由缘生无人我故。翻彼外道说有我等。然犹未说法无我理。即《四阿含经》等。第二时中。虽依遍计所执。而说诸法自性皆空。翻彼小乘。然于依他圆成。犹未说有。即诸部《般若》等。第三时 中。就大乘正理。具说三性三无性等。方为尽理。即《解深密经》等。是故于彼因缘生法。初唯说有。即堕有边。次唯说空。即堕空边。既各堕边。俱非了义。后时具说所执性空。余二为有。契合中道。方为了义。此依《解深密经》判。

二智光论师远承文殊、龙树。近禀提婆、清辩。依《般若》等经《中观》等论。亦立三教。以明无相大乘为真了义。谓佛初鹿园为诸小根说于四谛。明心境俱有。次于中时。为彼中根说法相大乘。明境空心有唯识道理。以根犹劣未能令入平等真空故作是说。于第三时。为上根说无相大乘。辨心境俱空。平等一味为真了义。又初则渐破外道自性等。故说因缘生法决定是有。次则渐破小乘缘生实有之执。故说依他因缘假有。以（242c1）彼怖畏此真空故。犹在假有而接引之。后时方就究竟大乘。说此缘生即是性空平等一相。是故即判法相大乘有所得等。为第二时非真了义也。此三教次第。如智光论师《般若灯论释》中。引《大乘妙智经》说。

问：此二所说。既各圣教互为矛盾。未审二说可和会以不。

答：此有二义。谓无会无不会。

　　　　　　初无会者。既并圣教随缘益物。何俟须会。即是《智论》四悉檀中。各各为人悉檀。是故虽有相违。而不可会。亦是《摄论》四意趣中。众生乐欲意趣。于一法中或赞或毁。是故二说不须和会。

二无不会者。通论此二所设教门。了与不了有其二门。一约摄生宽狭。言教具阙。以明了不了。二约益物渐次。显理增微。以明了不了。

初中有二。

　　先约摄生宽狭者。依《解深密经》。初时唯为发趣声闻乘说。第二时中唯为发趣大乘者说。此二各唯摄一类机。摄机不尽。故各非了。第三时中普为发趣一切乘者说。此中摄机普该诸乘。故云普为一切乘说。摄机周尽。方为了义。

二约言教具阙者。约机取教。则初时唯说小乘。第二唯说大乘。第三具说三乘。前二各互阙教不具。故非了义。后一具三乘。教满为了义。由此等义。是故第三方为了义。戒贤所立依此门判。

第二门内亦二。

　　初约益物渐次者。谓初时所说唯令众生得小乘益。益未究竟。故非了义。第二时中虽益通大小。然不能令趣寂二乘亦得大乘。是故此说亦非尽理。第三时中（243a1）普皆令得大乘之益。纵入寂者亦令回向大菩提故。是故《经》云：“唯此一事实。余二则非真”。又云，“若以小乘化。我则堕悭贪。此事为不可。”是故此说方为了义。

二约显理增微者。初说缘生以为实有。次说缘生以为假有。后说缘生方是性空。前二所说显理未周。会缘未尽。故非了义。后一显理至究。会缘相尽。故为了义。由此等义。是故第三方为究竟了义大乘。亦即初唯小乘。次具三乘。后唯一乘故也。智光所立依此门判。由有如此二种门故。是故圣教各依一势以明权实。互不相违。

问：若如所说。两宗各初唯说小乘。何故《华严》亦最初说。而非小乘。

答：此难诸德总有三释。

　　一云。约渐悟机立三法轮有此渐次。若顿悟机。则最初亦说彼《华严》等。若尔。《密迹力士经》初时具说三乘之法。此为其渐。为其顿耶。若是渐教。应唯说小。若是顿教。应唯说大。是故难解。

一云。若依显了门。则如前有此三法次第。若约秘密门。则同时皆有。若尔。则初时小显而大密。何不以大显而小密耶。又判此显密。出何圣教。理既不齐。又无圣教。故亦难依。

一云。但是如来圆音一演。异类等解。就小结集。故唯说小。就大结集故唯说大。就通结集故说三乘。若尔。说《华严》时。何故声闻不闻自所闻。乃如聋盲无所见闻。是亦难解。今解此难。

泛论如来圆音说法。大例有二。

　　一为此世根定者说。

　　二为此世根不定说。

　　　　初中自有三节。

　　　　　　一或有（243b1）众生。此世小乘限性定者。唯见如来从始至终但说小乘。如小乘诸部不信大乘者是。

二或有众生。此世三乘根性熟者。则唯见如来从始至终但说三乘。如《密迹力士经》。“说佛初鹿园说法之时。无量众生得阿罗汉果。无量众生得辟支佛道。无量众生发菩提心住初地等。”广如彼说。《大品经》中亦同此说。是故后时所说皆通三乘。如诸大乘经中说也。

三或有众生。此世一乘根性熟者。则唯见如来初树王下华藏界中。依海印三昧。说无尽圆满自在法门。唯为菩萨。如《华严经》等说。

是故诸说各据当根所得。互不相违也。

　　　　二不定根者有二位。

　　　　　　一此世小乘根不定故。堪可进入三乘位者。则初闻唯小为不了教。次唯说大亦非了教。后具说三乘方为了义。故有《深密经》中三时教也。

二此世小乘根不定故。堪可进入一乘位者。则初闻小乘为不了教。次通三乘亦非了教。后唯说一乘方为了教。智光所立当此意也。

　　　　是故由有于此世中根定不定二位别故。令此教门或有前后。或无前后也。上来总明叙会诸教竟。

第二随教辨宗者。现今东流一切经论。通大小乘。宗途有四。

一随相法执宗。即小乘诸部是也。

二真空无相宗。即《般若》等经。《中观》等论所说是也。

三唯识法相宗。即《解深密》等经。《瑜伽》等论所说是也。

四如来藏缘起宗。即《楞伽》《密严》等经。《起信》《宝性》等论所说是也。

　　此四之中。

　　　　初则随事执相说。

二则会事显理说。

三则依理起事（243c1）差别说。

四则理事融通无碍说。以此宗中许如来藏随缘成阿赖耶识。此则理彻于事也。亦许依他缘起无性同如。此则事彻于理也。

又此四宗。

　　初则小乘诸师所立。

　　二则龙树提婆所立。

　　三是无着世亲所立。

　　四是马鸣坚慧所立。

然此四宗亦无前后时限差别。于诸经论亦有交参之处。

宜可准知。今此论宗意当第四门也。（243c8）

Appendix Ⅱ

Chinese Text（《大乘起信论义记》，卷二，T 1846：44.262a9-262c8）：Fǎzàng on“the Arising and Ceasing Mind as Not Awake”and“the Self-Awareness of the Ālayavijñāna.”

Note：In the following transcription，passages and phrases from the Qǐxìn lùnare given in an alternate（楷书）font so as to distinguish them from Fǎzàng's commentary.Where Fǎzàng quotes whole sentences from the treatise they are given in larger type.Progressive indentation is used to reveal the structure of the commentary.

第二不觉中有三。

初明根本不觉。

二“生三种”下明枝末不觉。三“当知无明”下结末归本。

又亦可

初明不觉体。

次明不觉相。

后结相同体。

　　前中有二。

　　　　初依觉成迷。

　　　　后依迷显觉。

　　　　亦则释疑也。以彼妄依真起无别体故。还能返显于真。即是内熏功能也。由是义故。经中说言。“凡诸有心悉有佛性”。以诸妄念必依于真。由真力故。令此妄念无不返流故也。

初中有三。谓：

　　法

　　喻

　　合也。

所言不觉义者。谓不如实知真如法一故。不觉心起而有其念。念无自相不离本觉。

　　　　　　法中。初不了如理一味故。释根本“不觉义”。如迷正方也。“不觉念起”者。业等相念。即邪方也。“念无自相”下明邪无别体不离正方也。即明不觉不离觉也。

犹如迷人。依方故迷。若离于方，则无有迷。众生亦尔。依觉故迷。若离觉性则无不觉。

　　　　　　喻合可知。

以有不觉妄想心故，能知名义为说真觉。若离不觉之心，则无真觉自相可说。

　　后文中二。

　　　　初明妄有起净之功。后明真有待妄之（262b1）义。良以依真之妄方能显真。随妄之真还待妄显故也。

第二末中略作二种释。

一约喻说意。

二就识释文。

初者本觉真如其犹净眼。热翳之气如根本无明。翳与眼合动彼净眼。业识亦尔。由净眼动故有病眼起。能见相亦尔。以有病眼向外观故。即有空华妄境界现。境界相亦尔。以有空华境故。令其起心分别好华恶华等。智相亦尔。由此分别坚执不改。相续相亦尔。由执定故于违顺境取舍追遣。执取相亦尔。由取相故于上复立名字。若有相未对时。但闻名即执。计名字相亦尔。既计名取相发动身口。攀此空华造善恶业受苦乐报。长眠生死而不能脱。皆由根本无明力也。

第二释文中有二。

　　初无明为因生三细。

　　后境界为缘生六麁。

　　前中亦二。谓

　　　　总标

　　　　别解。

复次，依不觉故，生三种相，与彼不觉相应不相离。

　　　　　　　　　　标中言“与彼不觉……不相离”者。明相不离体故，末不离本故。以依无明成妄心。依忘心起无明故也。

云何为“三”？

前中三细即为“三”。各有标释。

一者，无明业相。以依不觉故，心动说名为业。觉则不动。动则有苦，果不离因故

　　　　　　　　　　初中释内。“以依不觉”者。释标中无明。即根本无明也。“心动名业”者。释标中“业”也。此中“业”有二义。

一“动作义”。是“业”义故。云“依不觉故心动名为业”也。“觉则不动”者。反举释成。既得始觉时即无动念。是知今动只由不觉也。

二为“因义”。是“业”义故。云“动则有苦”。如得寂静无念（262c1）之时。即是涅槃妙乐。故知今动则有生死苦患。“果不离因”者。不动既乐。即知动必有苦。动因苦果既无别时。故云“不相离”也。此虽动念而极微细。缘起一相能所不分。即当梨耶自体分也。如《无相论》云。“问此识何相何境界。答相及境界不可分别。一体无异。”当知此约赖耶业相义说也。下二约本识见相二分为二也。

NOTES

1.The term 生灭，which is often，but incorrectly，read as the equivalent of saṃsāra （生死），seems rather to be one of the many examples in the Qǐxìn lùnof terminology derived from the Lakāvatāra Sūtra.Here is one example particularly relevant to the Qǐxìn lùn 's use of the term 生灭：

yadi hi Mahāmate ālayavijñānasaṃabditas tathāgatgarbho “tra na syād ity asati Mahāmate tathāgatagarbha ālayavijñānasaṃabdite na pravttir na nivttisyāt.bhavati ca Mahāmate pravittir nivtti ca bālāryāṇām/svapratyātmārya-gati-da-dharma-sukha vihāreṇa ca viharanti yogino”nikipta-prayogā（Nanjio ed.，222）.

Bodhiruci translated this passage as follows：

大慧！若如来藏阿梨耶识名为无者，离阿梨耶识无生无灭。一切凡夫及诸圣人，依彼阿梨耶识故有生有灭，以依阿梨耶识故，诸修行者入自内身圣行所证现法乐行而不休息。（《楞伽经》 T 671：16.556c28-557a1）

Relying on the Bodhiruci translation in comparison with the Sanskrit，we read this passage as：

“Oh，Mahāmati，if there were no tathāgatgarbhacalled ālayavijñāna，there would be no arising and ceasing.（But）as all beings，common and noble alike，are dependent on the ālayavijñāna，there is arising and ceasing.And，as they are dependent on the ālayavijñāna， cultivators still persist in practice（even though）they have entered into the immediate dharma-joy they have personally realized by their noble conduct.”

Here we see good scriptural warrant for theQǐxìn lùn 's distinctive claim of the reciprocal identity of the ālayavijñānaand the tathāgatgarbha， upon which，in turn，rests the claim that in its deepest nature the mind of a sentient being is both“awake”and“not awake”.Many more examples of possible scriptural sources influential in the composition of the Qǐxìn lùnhave been helpfully assembled by Ōtake Susumu 大竹晋 in his excellent study，（Daijōkishinron）seiritsu mondai no kenkyū：（Daijōkishinron）wa kanbun bunken kara no pachiwāku「大乗起信論」成立問題の研究：「大乗起信論」は漢文仏教文献からのパッチワーク［Tokyo：Kokusho kankōkai（国書刊行会），2017］，to which（p.108）I am indebted for the discovery of this particular example.See also Ishii Kōsei's 石井公成 review of Ōtake's book in Komazawa daigaku bukkyō gakubu kenkyū kiyō 駒澤大学仏教学部研究紀要，no.76（March 2018）：1-9.

2.For the edited Chinese text of this section of the Qǐxìn lùn，see Appendix I.

3.T 1846：44.242a25-243c8.A complete English translation of Fǎzàng's Qǐxìn lùn Commentary has been published by Dirck Vorenkamp — An English Translation of Fa-tsang's Commentary on the Awakening of Faith （Lewiston，Queenston，and Lampeter：The Edwin Mellen Press，2004）.While I find Vorenkamp's work to be impressively meticulous I often disagree with his translations and interpretations，and in some cases the disagreements are substantial.

4.See Huáyánjīng tànxuán jì（《华严经探玄记》）（T：35.110c19-111c7）.Among the ten experts whose doctrinal classification schemes Fǎzàng sketches are Pāramārtha，founder of the Shèlùn （摄论）tradition，Bodhiruci and Huìguāng（慧光）of the Dìlùn （地论）tradition，the Tiāntái（天台）founders Huìsī（慧思）and Zhìyǐ（智顗），and the Korean monk Wǒnhyo（元晓）.Special attention should be paid to the classification system of Wǒnhyo，who had composed an earlier commentary，Qǐxìn lùn shū （《起信论疏》，T1844），which was known to Fǎzàng and was influential upon own commentary.Likewise，the classification systems of Pāramārtha，Bodhiruici，and Huìguāng are especially noteworthy because they were directly incorporated into the Huáyán classification system first formulated by Fǎzàng's teacher Zhìyǎn（智俨）.Concerning the Tànxuán jì，one should be aware of the value to its study of the five-volume，thoroughly annotated Japanese translation by Sakamoto Yukio（坂本幸男），which is included in the series Kokuyaku issaikyō（国訳一切経）as vols.6-10 of the“Scriptural Commentaries Subsection”（経疏部）of the“Japanese and Chinese Compositions Section”（和漢選述部）of that collection.This translation was originally published in 1937，but a“revised edition”（revised only in format）was published in 1980，in Tokyo，by Daitō Shuppansha（大東出版社）.As Fǎzàng's Exegetical Notes often draws on the Tànxuán jì，Sakamoto's work is helpful in the study of the former as well.We know that the Tànxuán jì was composed in 690 — see Chén Jīnhuá（陈金华），Philosopher，Practitioner，Politician：The Many Lives of Fǎzàng（643—712）（Leiden：E.J.Brill，2007，p.20）.The exact date of the composition of the Exegetical Notes is not known，but it can be presumed to have been later.We do know that in the year 699 Fǎzàng assisted ikānanda with the second“translation”of the Qǐxìn lùn —See Chén，op.cit.，pp.143，226，386.

5.Fǎzàng's account here of what he learned from Divākara about the doctrinal classification systems of these two Indian sages seems to have been taken from the more extensive account of the same and related matters given in the Tànxuán jì （T 1733：35.111c8-115c3）.Apart from the information received from Divākara and recorded by Fǎzàng，most of what we know about these two Indian monks derives from the accounts by Xuánzàng and his disciples of the great pilgrim's time at Nālandā，where īlabhadra was then the elderly abbot and Jñānaprabha was a senior teacher.īlabhadra is the better known of the two.He was the leading doctrinal disciple of Dharmapāla，whose version of Yogācāra Xuánzàng viewed as most authoritative.The doctrinal affiliation of Jñānaprabha has been a subject of some controversy and confusion.All testimony about him identifies him as an adherent of Madhyamaka.However，he has also been identified as a disciple of īlabhadra and for this reason some have assumed that he too must have been a Yogācārin.However，this conundrum，which led some to go so far as to speculate that there may have been two Jñānaprabha-s，is likely the result of misunderstanding the relationship between an Indian monk's doctrinal position and his status as a member of the monastic community.In particular，it may be the result of assuming that īlabhadra's status as abbot of Nālandā，where the younger Jñānaprabha also taught，meant that the latter must have been a doctrinal disciple，as well as a clerical subordinate，of the former.This，however，is an unnecessary and unsupported assumption that fails to appreciate the doctrinal diversity of great institutions of monastic learning like Nālandā.

6.The word lǐ （理）presents special challenges to both the interpreter and the translator.Conventionally but inadequately translated as“principle”，the “lǐ”of a thing is understood in the philosophical usage of Buddhism and in other traditions of Chinese thought to be the inherent structure of a thing，its sustaining constitution，its constitutive truth.If western analogies may be permitted，it might be described as the“nature”（φσις/phýsis）of a thing，its quidditas，its essence（in the Aristotelian sense of“”，“quod quid est”=“the what-it-is-ness”or“what-it-has-always-been-ness”of the thing）.The Chinese word，as used here，does not translate any Sanskrit word but it does bear some relation to concepts expressed in Sanskrit by terms like svalakana （自相 =“proper character”）or jāti-lakana （真相=“true nature”，“distinctive character”），which are free of the ontological implications found in deceptively similar terms like svabhāva （自性）.Especially when used of an array of things，or of the totality of things，“lǐ”is distantly analogous in meaning to the “λογοσ/logos＿”of the Stoics.In Huáyán usage it often labels the epistemological object（ālambana，缘）of“insight”or“wisdom”（prajñā，智）and the object of“realization”（abhisamaya/ abhisambuddha，证）.As such “lǐ”has been understood in some strains of East Asian Buddhist thought to be a constructive enunciation of the truth that all things are empty（ūnya，空），i.e.，the“principle”of the insubstantiality of all things，the absence from all things and beings of self-existence（svabhāva，自性），which absence is paradoxically said to“constitute”what things and beings most essentially are.Other strains of Chinese Buddhist thought treat the word as the label of a kind of presence rather than a kind of absence.They may identify it，for example，as the inherence of Buddhahood，or the seed thereof，in all sentient beings（all epistemological subjects），or as the presence of suchness（tathatā，真如）or truth（dharmatā，法性）in all things（all epistemological objects）.In the characteristic discourse of the Huáyán tradition a creative tension is maintained between apophasis（遮诠）and cataphasis（表诠）such that the doctrine of lǐ as emptiness and the doctrine of lǐ as inherent Buddha-nature or dharma-nature or suchness are understood to be two means by which to apprehend the same ultimately ineffable truth，the former seen as propaedeutic to the latter，the latter seen as culminative.This is the basic position of the Qǐxìn lùn.

7.The term “zōng”（宗）is inherently polysemic and therefore often hard to translate.Rooted in the ancient Chinese concept of ancestral descent，it is often used also to mean“doctrinal lineage”or“tradition of thought”.In certain contexts，it has a more institutional connotation and then may be understood to mean“school”or even“sect”.However，it can also refer to the core concept，basic argument，or governing intellectual disposition that lies at the heart of any system of doctrine，thereby giving a teaching lineage or school its distinctive character.In this sense it may be thought of as the underlying code，the conceptual DNA，that defines a particular lineage or school and accounts for the continuity of its development.In this latter sense it can be legitimately understood to mean“essential doctrine”or“fundamental tenet”.In this sense also the word is often juxtaposed，as it is here，with the word “jiào”（教）so as to distinguish between a discursively formulated teaching or system of teachings，on the one hand，and，on the other hand，the principle that gives a teaching its basic meaning or that lies at the heart of a doctrinal system.

8.The long-standing and vexed question of the authenticity and origin of the Qǐxìn lùn is far too complex to be fully addressed here.Suffice it to say that I find most persuasive the hypothesis lately proposed by scholars like Ōtake Susumu，Ishii Kōsei［and variously foreshadowed by earlier scholars like Mochizuki Shinkō（望月信亨），Liáng Qǐchāo（梁启超），Walter Liebenthal，Lv Chéng（吕澄），and others］.According to this hypothesis，the work is neither wholly a Chinese composition nor wholly a translation from an Indic language.Rather it seems likely that it emerged somehow from the circle of the Indian missionary Bodhiruci and that it likely incorporates language and concepts from Bodhiruci's various extant and inextant translations，from his oral commentary on those texts，and from notes taken by his students.This hypothesis allows for two equally possible，and possibly convergent，scenarios——first the possibility that Bodhiruci's teachings conveyed to China strains of Indian Mahāyāna thought that were not well preserved later in India；second，that Bodhiruci and other early sixth century Indian missionaries to China developed teachings shaped in part by their encounters with Chinese traditions and thinkers，or that they joined with their Chinese interlocutors in the creation of new Chinese-influenced formulations of originally Indian Buddhist ideas.In other words，it need not be the case that all that is new or seemingly anomalous in the Qǐxìn lùn must be attributed solely to Chinese authors who could not understand the Indian teachings or who rejected them.Nor must it be that the Qǐxìn lùn is simply a faithful translation of the work of some unnamed Indian author.This flexible hypothesis accommodates well the established fact that in the Dìlùn （地论）tradition of Bodhiruci（and Ratnamati，et al.），Yogācāra，Tathāgatgarbha，and ūnyavāda themes were variously intertwined in something like the way they are intertwined in the Qǐxìn lùn.See，inter alia，Ōtake，「Daijōkishinron」 seiritsu mondai no kenkyū（cited above in note # 1）.Of course，the question of who actually composed the text remains open.Among the several sixth century scholar-monks who have been identified by earlier scholars as possible authors or compilers are Paramārtha（the alleged“translator”），Tánzūn（昙遵，475？—577？），Dàochong（道宠，477？—573？），Tánqiān 昙迁（541—607），and Bodhiruci himself，but no consensus has yet been reached.Well worth considering，however，is the very recent and quite intriguing suggestion made by John Jorgensen of Australia's La Trobe University，in a conference paper not yet published，that the author may have been Tánlín（昙林）（d.u.）.Little of Tánlín's corpus of writings survives；we have only a few brief prefaces and introductions to translations from his brush.Moreover，he is known to modern scholars chiefly for his association with several of the progenitors of the Chán or proto-Chán tradition.Nevertheless，it is significant that Tánlín was also eminently learnèd in the very array of texts and doctrinal traditions from which the Qǐxìn lùnseems to have arisen.He worked with Bodhiruci and other Indian figures in Bodhiruci's circle，assisting them in their translations（including several Yogācāra texts by Vasubandhu）.We can therefore safely assume that he was quite well versed in the terminology and patterns of usage that characterize the translations and exegetical discourse of Bodhiruci and his associates，and we now know that those translations and that discourse echo clearly in the Qǐxìn lùn.We also know that Tánlín had a special interest in sources of tathāgatgarbhadoctrine like the rīmālā，Lakāvatāra， and Nirvāṇa sūtras，all of which were clearly influential upon the Qǐxìn lùn.All of this would seem，then，to qualify Tánlín well for the role of composer of the treatise. Although Jorgensen's case is not，and probably cannot ever be，“proven”，he has shown it to be eminently plausible.

9.It is worth noting that Zhìyǎn is said to have composed two commentaries on the Qǐxìnlùn，both listed in Uichǒn's 义天（1055—1101）Catalogueof his Supplement to the Canon （《新编诸宗教藏总录》，卷3—T 2184：55.1175a4-5）.Unfortunately，neither of them is extant.

10.On this change in the history of Huáyán thought see Peter N.Gregory，Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism （Princeton：Princeton University Press，1991），especially pp.162-167.

11.For the edited Chinese text of this section of the Qǐxìn lùn，see Appendix II.

12.One is reminded of the distinction in modern western philosophy，following Gottlob Frege，between Bedeutung （“reference”，意持/所指）and Sinn （“sense”，意义）.The sense of a word or proposition is something that resides in the word or the proposition.The referent is the extrinsic thing or idea to which the word or proposition refers.The sense of a word or proposition may be described as the way in which it presents its referent.The classic examples are the terms“morning star”and“evening star”.Both terms refer to the same planetary body（Venus）but they present that one referent in two different ways，setting it in two different contexts.This distinction has been the focus of much philosophical analysis.It and its implications have been subjected to a variety of contending interpretations and critiques.Nevertheless，it is at least worth considering whether or not it is a distinction that may prove useful in efforts to understand，for example，what the Qǐxìn lùn means when it speaks of the one mind as both the mind of suchness and the mind that arises and ceases.It may help us appreciate that these two，and other pairs mentioned in the text，are more than simply names for two“parts”or two collaborating aspects，of one thing.That is too simple an interpretation and the Qǐxìn lùn is saying more than that.It is saying，I would suggest，that each is the whole of the dharma to which it refers，just as“evening star”and“morning star”each refers to the whole of Venus and not just to one part or feature of that planet.

13.It is clear from the outset that the Qǐxìn lùn does not use the term “mahāyāna”in the most customary sense［which is perhaps why it speaks of móhēyǎn （摩诃衍）rather than of dàshèng，大乘］.Rather than refer simply to the greatest of Buddhism's several“vehicles”the Qǐxìn lùn regards “mahāyāna”as a name for ultimate reality，the great truth about all things，the great“way”that all things are.

14.We have conscientiously avoided the conventional translation of 觉（bodhi）as“enlightenment”or“enlightened”.These are poor translations that carry with them too much western baggage while ignoring the all-important plain or literal meaning of both the Sanskrit and the Chinese originals.We are aware，however，of the fact that although the adjective“awake”or the passive participles“woke”or“awoken”are often appropriate translations，the word“awakening”，although better than“enlightenment”，has its own deficiencies.“Awakening”is a gerund（动名）and so could be taken to signify only the process or moment of“waking up”to reality or truth.But the word 觉 as used here more often refers not so much to the process or moment of waking up（that is what 始觉 means）as to the condition of having woken up.It is as though the English language needs some other word that it does not really have，like“awake-ness”or“awake-ment”.Nor is the word“wakefulness”always quite suitable because it seems to refer to a quality or state of mind rather than to the nature of mind or its essential constitution.

15.It may seemindeed，it is-far-fetched，but I cannot help but note that the Qǐxìn lùn 's reflections on the dual nature of the one mind as both awake and not awake，and on the dual nature of the one awake mind as both incipiently awake and originally awake，is distantly analogous，i.e.，structurally but not substantively similar，to Early Christian reflections on the nature of Christ as both fully divine and fully human.The Fathers of the Church arrived at the orthodox conclusion that Christ was two natures（physes，naturae），one divine and the other human，in one individual or person（hypostasis，persona）— two“what-s”，as it were，comprising a single“who”.Whether ancient Greek categories like“nature”and“person”or“individual”could be useful in interpreting the Qǐxìn lùn is an open question worthy of attention at least by comparative philosophers and theologians if not by Buddhist scholars.This analogy，I believe，partly accounts for the keen interest in the Qǐxìn lùn on the part of Christian thinkers that began in the late 19th century with Timothy Richard/Lǐ Tímótài（李提摩太，1845—1919），the first westerner to study the Qǐxìn lùn after being introduced to it by Yáng Wénhùi（杨文会，1837—1911），the founder of modern Chinese Buddhism and an ardent devotee of the treatise who credited it with his own conversion to Buddhism.Since the time of Richard and continuing even today，Christian interest in the text has generated numerous essays and dissertations by Christian theologians.（So keen was Richard's ill-informed but enthusiastic interest in the Qǐxìn lùn that he went to the absurd length of suggesting that it was actually a crypto-Christian text and that it may have resulted from an encounter at the court of the Indo-Scythian king Gondophares（多法勒斯）between Asvaghod and the Apostle Thomas（使徒多马）！ When I give free rein to my own imagination I wonder，in this connection，if Fǎzàng might ever have met a Syrian Christian like Alopen（阿罗本）when they were both residing in Cháng'ān or Luòyáng.But for this，of course，there is not the slightest bit of evidence.）

16.“Momentary conceptualizations”is a somewhat cumbersome translation intended to convey at once two senses of the word 念——the sense of“moment”or“instant”（kaṇa，刹那）and the sense of“thought”or“thinking”，the latter in the sense of constructive or discriminative and thus erroneous thought or thinking（vikalpa，et al.）.It is quite likely，I think，that this word often carried both connotations when used in Chinese Buddhist discourse.The word is also commonly used to convey the notion of mindfulness or awareness（smｔｉ），but that sense seems not to apply here.

17.The term 相 is most often used in the Qǐxìn lùn，and in Huáyán，as the equivalent of the Sanskrit lakana，which can be rendered into English as“mark”or“characteristic”or“attribute”or“quality”.All of these translations are appropriate provided one understands that the characteristics or qualities so labelled are more than merely accidental features.Rather they are features that distinguish one kind of thing from other kinds of things.They are thus necessary and indispensable parts of the character of the thing without which the thing would not be what it is.In many cases“lakana ”has the implied sense of“jāti-lakana ”（真相）and thus functions as the epistemological counterpart of the ontological term svabhāva （自性）.One might well say that the term“lakana”is used to define a thing epistemologically whereas “svabhāva”（or “nisvabhāva”）is used to define it ontologically.In any case，although the lakana of a thing may not be its single most essential aspect neither is it a minor or dispensable quality of the thing.

18.This passage is a challenge to construe and susceptible to differing readings.In the translation given here（which takes the word 幻 as an adverb modifying the verb or adjective 差别）we have followed Fǎzàng's gloss：

“随染幻差别”者，是“无漏”法也。“性染幻差别”者，是“无明”法也。以彼“无明”迷平等理，是故其“性”自是“差别”。故下文云，“如是无明自性差别故也。”（T 1846：44.264b1-4）

Here Fǎzàng explains the mark of difference（异相）between the mind awake and the mind unawake in terms of the intrinsic purity（无漏）of the former，which，despite that purity，can nevertheless adjust to or accommodate defilement（随染）.By contrast，the mind unawake with its ignorance（无明）is held to defiled by its very nature.He proceeds further by analyzing the two key clauses in the passage——随染幻差别［“it is by involvement with defilement that（the mind awake，in its purity）is apparitionally differentiated”］and 性染幻差别［“it is by its very nature as defiled that（the mind unawake，in its ignorance）is apparitionally differentiated］.He says that the first clause refers to the way in which the mind awake differs from the mind unawake insofar as its status as a pure dharma（无漏法）is not compromised by its being involved in defiled apparitional differentiations（随染）.The second clause，he says，indicates that the awake mind and the unawake mind are apparitionally differentiated from each other in the sense that the latter，as a dharma of ignorance（无明法），has defilement as its very nature（性染）.For ignorance，he says，“obscures the truth of sameness”（彼无明迷平等理）and differentiation is its very nature（其“性”自是差别）.In support of this analysis he points to a later passage in the Qǐxìn lùn which says，“because in this way the self-nature of ignorance is differentiation”.So，the point of the passage is that the difference between the mind awake and the mind unawake is a real as well as an apparent difference，but not so real，or not real in such a way，as to entail bifurcation of the mind.They are not two different minds.That they may appear to be so substantively different as to constitute two minds is a function of the unrecognized fact that the inviolate purity of the awakened mind can tolerate involvement with defilement without compromising its inherent purity，whereas the unawake，ignorant mind has the nature of defilement in the epistemological sense of error.It is the name we give to the misapprehension of the oneness of the mind.

19.The term 业 renders the word karma in its primitive sense of deliberate action on the part of a sentient being，i.e.，action which，because it is deliberate or intentional，has necessary（“karmic”）consequences for the actor.

20.Here Fǎzàng is referring not to causality in the general sense but to causality as operative in the multi-dimensional mind as conceived in the Yogācāra tradition（the eight consciousnesses，including the ālayavijñāna）.According to this tradition，suffering is caused by the foundational mind's nature as inherently active or unstill.

21.I take the word 今（“at present”，“now”）to signify that the causal relationship between suffering and the unawake character of the mind's movement is a simultaneous relation.It is not the case that the cause precedes the effect.Rather，both cause and effect occur“in the present”.

22.The term 自体分［literally：“inherent-substance part（of consciousness）”］is found in the *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi （《成唯识论》）（T 1585：31.10b3-7）where it is said to be the self-nature of both the subjective and the objective aspects of cognition—i.e.，of both its“seeing part”（darana-bhāga，见分）and its“image part”（nimitta-bhāga，相分）.It is the more precisely defined as“nothing other than self-awareness”（即自证分），i.e.as the“third part”of consciousness，which is said to be an“actual”thing（dravya，事）thing and the basis（āraya，所依）of the other two parts.In Fǎzàng's use of this notion we have a reference，relatively rare in Huáyán writings，to a topic that looms especially large in later Indo-Tibetan Buddhist thought and in modern philosophical analyses of Buddhism as well，namely，the topic of self-awareness or reflexive awareness（svasaṃvedana or svasaṃvitti），the existence of which as a distinct kind of consciousness is generally affirmed in the Yogācāra tradition but denied in the Madhymaka tradition.That Fǎzàng invokes this notion，which he characterizes as“extremely subtle”，in order to explain the unawake nature of the“arising and ceasing mind”（the ālayavijñāna）is worthy of special notice.For more on the topic of self-awareness and its relationship to the Qǐxìn lùn and to Huáyán，see the stimulating article by Yáo Zhìhuá（姚治华），“‘Suddenly Deluded Thoughts Arise’：Karmic Appearance in Huayan Buddhism”，Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37：2（June 2010）：198-214.It was in Yáo's article that I first came upon this inconspicuous but crucially significant claim by Fǎzàng.See also Yáo's general discussion of the theme of self-awareness in Indian Buddhist thought—The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition （London：Routledge，2005）.The literature on svasaṃvitti in the later Indo-Tibetan traditions of logic and epistemology is abundant and interest in the Buddhist concept in modern analytical epistemology and philosophy of mind（sometimes with reference back to Kant on the“unity of apperception”）and in the cognitive sciences is growing.As examples of work in both areas see Christian Coseru，Perceiving Reality：Consciousness，Intentionality and Cognition in Buddhist Philosophy （Oxford：Oxford University Press，2012），especially chpt.8（pp.235-273）and Dan Arnold，“Self-Awareness（Svasaṃvitti）and Related Doctrines of Buddhists following Dignāga：Philosophical Characterizations of Some of the Main Issues”，Journal of Indian Philosophy 38.3（June 2010）：323-378.

23.This very brief text（T 1619），translated by Pāramārtha，is known also by the fuller title of《无相思尘论》（the original Sanskrit of which is hard to guess）.It is a fragment of Dignāga's（陈那）Ālambanaparīkā（Analysis of the Object of Consciousness），a classic statement of the great Yogācāra logician's claim that all objects of consciousness or cognition are themselves just representations，i.e.，mental，rather than extra-mental，phenomena.However，this passage is not found in the edition of the Wúxiāng lùn that we have today.